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1I. Introduction
It is a commonplace that the great works of social science have been subject to a
number of rivalrous interpretations.  Thus, in economics, one often sees a
received, and typically neoclassical, interpretation being up for attack from the
perspective of heterodox interpretations (and I shall follow this established
practice in the present paper).   This is the case of the works of, notably, Marshall,
and Keynes.   Experts in hermeneutics may lecture us at length about the reasons
why the great works are interpreted differently, and about the perplexities of
textual interpretation.  For example, when considering alternative interpretations,
a basic dilemma is that what the “facts” of the text mean and their significance in
the context of the whole text, is dependent upon their interpretation, so that there
really is no external, “objective” arbiter outside of the interpretive schema for
purposes of arbitration.   Of course, this does not mean that we cannot engage in
a reasoned discussion of the merits of alternative interpretations (Popper 1994);
merely that there is no interpretation- independent standards that we may appeal
to.
I plan in this paper to discuss what I consider a great work of social science
(I hesitate in this connection to say “economics”, given the way this discipline
looks today), namely Edith Penrose’s 1959 book, The Theory of the Growth of the
Firm.   Specifically, my aims are
· to discuss critically various interpretations of Penrose (1959);
· to argue that existing interpretations have often overlooked or suppressed 
her essential ideas;
· and that these essential, and radical, ideas have important implications for 
contemporary theorizing about the firm.   Thus, I shall argue that  there is a 
case for re-opening the research program that Penrose sketched in The 
Theory of the Growth of the Firm.
2The focus will be almost exclusively on Penrose’s 1959 work.  This is certainly not
because it is the only interesting work she wrote.  Rather, it is undeniably her
masterpiece; a masterpiece, however, whose fundamental message has been
insufficiently appreciated.  Moreover, much of her other work is not related to the
arguments in this book, and are, thus, not relevant to bring into the discussion.1
My main argument, in short, is that although The Theory of the Growth of the
Firm has been widely read and even more widely cited, it has tended to be
interpreted in ways that do not give the text full justice.  Many important points
have been neglected or insufficiently appreciated.  Examples include Penrose’s
crucial distinction between resources and services, the notions of the “image” and
the “productive opportunity” (more about which later), and the attention she
pays to real managerial processes, and how these are manifested in the
accumulation and leverage of resources and services.
When viewed through the lens provided by what is arguably the dominant
contemporary approach to strategy research, namely the so-called, “resource-
based perspective” (Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Peteraf 1993), Penrose comes out
as one that shares the main aim of this approach, namely to analyze the
circumstances under which resources may provide long-lived rent streams (e.g.,
Barney 1996).   But this is actually only mentioned in The Theory of the Growth of
the Firm in a rather peripheral way.2 
The resource-based perspective is largely based on mainstream price-theory
reasoning (see Peteraf 1993; Foss 1996, 1998b).   However, in spite of this basic
neoclassical orientation, the perspective has not made contact with an older
literature that, among other things, attempted to cast Penrosian insights in
neoclassical terms; a literature that begins perhaps with Marris (1964) and
                                               
1   For example,  surprisingly Penrose’s work on multinationals (Penrose 1968, 1971) does not
draw on her 1959 book. Thanks to Neil Kay for pointing this out to me.
2  Note that I am not arguing that Penrose’s interest in the growth process is inconsistent with this
sort of resource-based research; only that it is not what primarily interests her.
3Baumol’s (1962) inclusion of Penrose (1959) under the rubric of “the managerial
theory of the firm”.3   The high point of this literature is Rubin’s (1973) attempt to
reconstruct Penrose (1959) in terms of finding the solution to the dynamic
optimization problem of balancing the development of new resources (using
existing resources) and the use of existing resources directly in production.
However, Penrose’s work has also been heavily cited by heterodox
economists (e.g., Loasby 1991; Earl 1996)4, and her foreword to the third edition
of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (published in 1995) leaves little doubt that
her sympathies were with more heterodox strands of economics.  In fact, it will be
argued that the limited inclusion of Penrosian ideas in neoclassical economics is
just another example of the “sponginess” of the mainstream that allows it to
seemingly incorporate diverse and heterodox insights without, however, really
taking seriously their heterodox nature (Section II: Penrosians - and Penrose ).
Rather than thinking narrowly of Penrose’s work as just another
contribution to the managerial theory of the firm or as the most important
precursor of the contemporary resource-based approach, it is more appropriate, I
shall argue, to think of Penrose as re-stating, refining, and sometimes
radicalizing, the basic conceptualization of the firm that can be found in the work
of Marshall and his later followers (cf. also Loasby 1991).   Specifically, like
Marshall, and later writers in his tradition,5 Penrose emphasized that not only is
the firm a repository of productive knowledge, but it is also an institution that
develops and manages this knowledge and that the two processes of developing
                                               
3  For a brilliant critique of this literature, see Loasby (1989).
4  I have argued elsewhere that the economist whose work in many respects lies closest to
Penrose’s is the idiosyncratic, but often brilliant Thorstein Veblen (Foss 1998a).
5  Such as Philip Andrews (1949), Jack Downie (1958), Harald Malmgren (1961), George
Richardson (1972), Brian Loasby (1991), Richard Langlois (1992), Nicolai Foss (1993),  Peter Earl
(1996), and Neil Kay  (1997).  For a splendid discussion of the post-Marshallian stream in
economics, see Finch (1997).
4and managing knowledge may be hard to separate, both in practice and
conceptually.
This, I shall argue, is the essential Penrosian point.  Moreover, it is one that
has been missed by the vast majority of those who have cited or quoted her
work.6   Typically, they have either emphasized her view of the firm as a
repository of specialized and heterogeneous production and organization
knowledge to the exclusion of the issue of the management of the associated
stocks and flows (this holds for resource-based writers), or they have emphasized
a single aspect of Penrose’s discussion of the management team (this holds for
those who have written on “the Penrose effect”) to the exclusion of almost
everything else in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.   I hope, however, to
demonstrate that focusing on both issues is a potentially extremely fruitful avenue
in research on the theory of the firm (Section III: Implications for Contemporary
Theorizing About the Firm).  Hence, the title of this paper.
II.  Penrosians - and Penrose
“The entire study [The Theory of the Growth of the Firm] is essentially a
single argument no step of which can be omitted without the risk of
misunderstanding later conclusions”  (Penrose 1959: xxii).
A. Penrose: Received Views
The usual outline of the main argument of Penrose’s 1959 book is well-known
and shall be only briefly summarized: Firms are collections of productive
resources that are organized in an administrative framework which partly
determines the amount and type of services that the resources yield.   As they go
along with their productive operations, firms - or, more precisely, the
management team - obtain increased knowledge of the services that may be
                                               
6  Exceptions to this generalization are Loasby (1991), Fransman (1994) and  Spender (1994).
5obtained from resource.  The results of such learning processes is, first, the
expansion of the firm’s “productive opportunity set” (the opportunities that the
firm’s management team can see and can take advantage of) and, second, the
release of managerial excess resources that can be put to use in other, mostly
related, business areas. Since the opportunity costs of excess resources are zero,
there will be a strong internal incentive for such diversification which in turn
causes the firm to grow - an idea that according to Penrose destroys the notion of
the firm’s optimum size.
However, the managerial resources inherited from the past set a limit to the
firm’s rate of growth - what has become known in the literature as “the Penrose
effect” (Slater 1980).7   In Penrose (1959), this is rationalized by pointing to the
difficulties of socializing new managers that are needed for the expansion of the
firm.  Later models (Baumol 1962; Marris 1964) imposed the Penrose effect
exogenously (Gander 1991), but eventually it became subordinated under
supposedly more general theories of adjustment costs in the theory of investment
of the firm (Treadway 1970).  Given this, and using a dynamic control theory
approach, the Penrose effect arises naturally as the profit-maximizing firm
calculates its optimal time-profile of outputs.   A steady-state equilibrium growth
pattern is shown to exist, in which firm size and management size grow at the
same rate (Marris 1964; Slater 1980; Gander 1991).
Thus, Penrose’s ideas became absorbed in mainstream economics by, first,
arguing that  her purportedly most important point, “the Penrose effect”, was just
a minor detail in the neoclassical analysis of optimal investment, and, second, by
demonstrating that Penrose’s critique of equilibrium economics should not really
be taken seriously, as her ideas were fully compatible with extended notions of
equilibrium.   This is not to deny that the basic skeleton of some of Penrose’s
ideas may be cast in the language of equilibrium and (dynamic) optimization
                                                                                                                                            
7  Richardson (1964) provides early empirical evidence.
6characteristic of mainstream economics.  But it is to argue that such
interpretations at the very least miss important aspects of The Theory of the Growth
of the Firm, and at their worst (and this is more likely) are grossly misleading.
Another, but rather different, stream of work that builds on foundations
partly derived from mainstream economics and explicitly takes the Penrose’s
work as a primary source of inspiration, is the recent resource-based approach to
the firm and to firm strategy.  The resource-based analysis of (sustained)
competitive advantages may be seen as  starting out from two basic empirical
generalizations, namely that 1) there are systematic differences across firms in the
extent to which they control resources that are necessary for implementing strategies,
and 2) that these differences are relatively stable.  The basic structure of the RBP
emerges when these two generalizations are combined with fundamental
assumptions that are to a large extent derived from economics.  Among these
assumptions are that 3) differences in firms’ resource endowments cause
performance differences, and 4) that firms seek to increase their economic
performance.  The fundamentals of the resource-based analysis of the conditions for
sustained competitive advantage are basically simple (Peteraf 1993).
We begin with the basic condition that resources must be heterogeneous in
order for efficiency differences, and therefore rents, to exist.  However, if the firm is
to appropriate this rent, further conditions must hold.  Thus, resources have to be
acquired at a price below their discounted net present value in order for the firm to
appropriate the rents flowing from the resource; otherwise, these will be fully
absorbed in the price paid for the resource.  Moreover, it should be difficult or
impossible for competitors to imitate or substitute rent-yielding resources.  However,
in successful firms there are often a number of mechanisms at work that make it hard
for competitors to copy the sources of competitive advantage of a successful firm.
For example, there may be “causal ambiguity”, which means that competitors
confront difficulties ascertaining precisely how a bundle of resource contributes to
success.   Finally, the resource should be relatively specific to the firm (in the sense of
7Williamson 1985).   Otherwise, the superior bargaining position that is obtained from
not being tied to a firm can be utilized by the resource (‘s owner) to appropriate the
rent (or, at least a large portion of the rent) that the resource helps create.   In other
words, the key question to ask here is, Who captures value from the resource, and
how may the firm capture more value from this resource?
Note that all of this, purportedly Penrosian analysis, is really just an application
of equilibrium price theory.8  For example, in connection with ex ante limits or
barriers to competition, these limits are evaluated relative to a full information,
competitive equilibrium (Barney 1986).  Indeed, the very concept of sustained
competitive advantage is often defined in equilibrium terms: it is that advantage
which lasts after all attempts at imitation have ceased.  This has the implication,
unfortunately, that sustained competitive advantage has no meaning outside
equilibrium, which to those who don’t believe that the world is not continuously in
competitive equilibrium, would surely seem to limit the practical relevance of this
concept.   Second, the above analysis actually tells us very little of direct value for
understanding the more dynamic and managerial aspects of competitive advantage,
such as how to build new resources, coordinate existing ones, etc. - all issues that are
crucial in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.9   For example, with respect to the issue
of coordinating activities, the resource-based perspective basically assumes that this
is unproblematical (Haanæs 1997).10  And to the extent that it has addressed
Penrosian issues, it has typically done so on a relatively aggregate level, talking
about corporate culture or the overall competence of the management team (the
                                               
8 More specifically, as I have argued elsewhere (Foss 1998b),  it is the Chicago-UCLA brand of price
theory on which the basic resource-based analysis of sustained competitive advantage is based.
9 J.C. Spender (1994) launches a similar critique: “When we overlook the resource application
processes we miss what it means to bundle resources together so that they become a firm. We
overlook the core of our theory of the firm, the process of coordinating the organization’s
activities ... Resource-based theory has paid little attention to the construction and management
of the bundle”.
10  One could arguably give this point a transaction cost or agency interpretation, so that in the
resource-based perspective all problems of incentive alignment are assumed away.
8same may be said of the managerialist theory of the firm).  But  Penrose was (also)
concerned with the more microscopic aspects and one might even construct an
argument that her theorizing leads us to what would in modern management
studies be called “strategic human resource management” where the focus is on  the
development of the firm’s pool of talents with particular goals in mind.11
We should not be surprised, therefore, that apparently Edith Penrose herself
remained skeptical towards the resource-approach - at least in the manifestation
considered here.12  For in fairness, it must be observed that an important research
theme in the resource-based perspective has in fact been diversification, and here
Penrose’s insights have arguably been more adequately represented, although much
of this literature is also cast within the maximization/equilibrium framework of
mainstream economics (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988).
B. Neglected Points in Penrose’s Analysis
Thus, there has been a powerful tendency to interpret Penrose’s ideas in terms of
mainstream economics.  And this is perhaps not so surprising, if we take these
ideas to merely be that 1) there is a constraint on the growth of the firm stemming
from the difficulties of expanding the management team, and 2) firm
heterogeneity is the source of differences among revealed competitive
advantages.   Both of these points lend themselves to formal modelling without
too much diffuculty.  Thus, we have already seen how formal modelling can
accommodate the idea of the managerial constraint on growth through the notion
of balanced firm growth (Marris 1964; Slater 1980), and we can also easily
imagine an equilibrium of firms with different efficiencies where the equilibrium
                                               
11  Thanks to Peter Earl for this point.
12   In his recent Ph.d. dissertation, Knut Haanæs (1997: 17) explains how he in a meeting with
Penrose  “... argued that the resource-based literature did not fully explain value-creation
(instead focusing on the value appropriation aspect).  Professor Penrose expressed a strong
agreement with my observations ... The problem was, she said, that the resource-based literature
had not fully pursued her position and had been too concerned with the analytical properties of
resources. The literature had, hence, partly neglected her fundamental insight that resources
were only a means to an end”.
9(and the different efficiencies) is sustained because of the existence of various
mechanisms (causal ambiguity, patents, etc.) that hinder the equalization of rents
across firms.13
It is more difficult to imagine a mainstream treatment of Penrose’s point that
efficient diversification takes place on the basis of the firm’s existing endowment
of resources and competencies - that efficient diversification lies “close in” to
existing competence areas-, and I don’t know of any formal models that address
this.   However, in principle it may be done, for example, by constructing some
sort of index of relatedness of input factors and telling some plausible (if not
entirely rigorous) story about the correspondence between this index and various
information and transaction costs (so that managing less related resources and
competencies imposes a information and transaction cost penalty).  Imposing the
requirement of choosing the optimal trade-off between the gains from
diversification and the costs of managing a diversified firm then allows one to
derive the optimal/equilibrium degree of diversification of the firm.
Let us not forget, however, that although such mainstream treatments of
Penrose’s insights may be valuable and justified, they, first, run counter to
Penrose’s own critique of (parts of) neoclassical economics, and, secondly,
typically leaves out crucial issues and aspects of Penrose’s analysis.
With respect to the first point, on Penrose’s own view, her theory
constituted a powerful critique against certain aspects of the neoclassical theory
of the firm.  In the neoclassical theory of the firm, she says, there is “... no notion of
an internal process of development leading to cumulative movements in any one
direction” (1959: 1), a notion that is absolutely crucial for understanding firm
development.   Rather, growth is simply a matter of adjusting to the equilibrium size
of the firm.  But if services are produced endogenously (and continuously)
through various intra-firm learning processes involving increased knowledge of
                                               
13  The seminal modeling effort here is Lippman and Rumelt (1982).
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resources, “new combinations of resources” (1959: 85), and an expanding
productive opportunity set, there is no equilibrium size.
Moreover, because of the difficulties of managing new resources and
services, and of assimilating new managers in the firm, firm growth is not smooth
or “balanced” (as in Marris 1964; Slater 1980).   On the contrary, growth rates in
succeeding periods will typically be negatively serially correlated, so that high
growth in one period is followed by low growth and vice versa.  In fact, this is the
true “Penrose effect”, and a first indication that even on this fundamental level,
Penrose has been partly misrepresented in the literature.    But, I shall, argue, if
we replace our mainstream spectacles with heterodox economics ones, there is
much more that becomes visible.
On the overall level, there is clearly what we perhaps today would
recognize as a Veblenian (the emphasis on cumulative causation and group-based
knowledge assets) and Schumpeterian (change “from within”) flavor to Penrose’s
overall argument.   Although she doesn’t refer even a single time to Veblen in The
Theory of the Growth of the Firm, her later (1995) nutshell conceptualization of main
message of the 1959 book is straight out of Veblen: “One of the primary
assumptions of the theory of the growth of firms is that ‘history matters’; growth
is essentially an evolutionary process and based on the cumulative growth of
collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm” (1959[1995]: xiii).  And
the Schumpeterian flavor of her work is more than a matter of spicing up the
arguments with the standard quotations from Schumpeter that mainstream
economists, too, fancy.
More fundamentally, Penrose’s basic vision of the competitive process in
general, and of the firm in particular, is, as we have already seen, disequilibrium-
oriented and, as I shall later argue, subjectivist.14  Moreover - and this is normally
overlooked - it stresses entrepreneurship, flexibility, change and uncertainty.
                                               
14  Quite in line with the post-Marshallian tradition of which she is often seen as an important
representative.
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This is arguably somewhat in contrast to the path-dependence and rigidity effects
with which her 1959 analysis is often associated, at least to extent that this
analysis is interpreted as an endorsement of only extremely narrow
diversification.   “In the long run”, Penrose explains,
... the profitability, survival and growth of a firm does not depend so
much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the production
of even a widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability
of the firm to establish one or more wide and relatively impregnable
‘bases’ from which it can adapt and extend its operations in an
uncertain, changing and competitive world (1959: 137).
Thus, seemingly paradoxically, flexibility and adaptation really are just as much
a message of the analysis as specialization is.  The paradox vanishes on realizing
that specialization in Penrose’s analysis means specialization in terms of the
underlying base of resources and competencies (rather than products) and that
such specialization may be fully consistent with seizing new business
opportunities, for example, in the form of diversifying to new product markets
that are, at least in terms of products, “unrelated” relative to the firm’s existing
product portfolio.15
In fact, as Penrose makes clear, there may be a considerable option value
associated even with a specialized base of resources and services:
A firm is basically a collection of resources.  Consequently, if we can
assume that businessmen believe there is more to know about the
resources they are working with than they do know at any given time,
and that more knowledge would be likely to improve the efficiency
and profitability of their firm, then unknown and unused productive
                                                                                                                                            
15  As she explains, “Firms, for the most part, do ‘specialize’, but in a much wider sense than the
‘logic’ of industrial efficiency would suggest, for the kind of ‘specialization’ they seek is the
development of a particular ability and strength in widely defined areas” (1959: 137; emphasis
added).
12
services immediately become of considerable importance, not only
because the belief that they exist acts as an incentive to acquire new
knowledge, but also because they shape the scope and direction of the
search for knowledge (Penrose 1959: 77).
In other words, “businessmen” may have a rational expectation that the resources
and services that they control may yield more options than are immediately
apparent and that further learning about them may reveal these options - a
striking anticipation of that real options thinking that has only made its way in
economics and the firm strategy field during the last five years.  Thus, firm
development is essentially an evolutionary and cumulative process of “resource
learning” (Mahoney 1995), in which increased knowledge of the firm’s resources
both help create options for further expansion and increases absorptive capacity
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), or, to use Penrose’s terminology an expanding
“productive opportunity”.
The firm’s productive opportunity, arguably the key concept of The Theory of
the Growth of the Firm (cf. also Fransman 1994: 744), is “... the productive
possibilities that its ‘entrepreneurs’’ see and can take advantage of.   A theory of
the growth of the firm is essentially an examination of the changing productive
opportunity of firms” (1959: 31-32).   Thus, the notion of productive opportunity
is quite a central notion in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.  Moreover, it is also
quite clearly a subjective (or, if you prefer, “constructivist”) category,16 hinging
on the, as modern organizational theorists (notably, Weick 1995) say, “enactment”
                                               
16  Penrose elaborates: “... for an analysis of the growth of the firm it is appropriate to start from
analysis of the firm rather than the environment and then proceed to a discussion of the effect of
certain types of environmental conditions.  If we can discover what determines entrepreneurial
ideas about what the firm can and cannot do, that is what determines the nature and extent of the
‘subjective’ productive opportunity of the firm, we can at least know where to look if we want to
explain or predict the actions of particular firms” (1959: 42).
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of the environment that the management team performs, so that “... the relevant
environment is not an objective fact discoverable before the event” (1959: 41). 17
Penrose’s subjectivism is particularly apparent in her adoption of Kenneth
Boulding’s (1956) concept of “the image”: “... the environment is treated ... as an
‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities and restrictions with which
he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an ‘image’ which in fact determines a
man’s behavior” (1959: 5).18 19 Thus, enacting the environment is clearly a part of
entrepreneurial action.  Indeed, anticipating Israel Kirzner’s (1973) theory of
entrepreneurship, Penrose notes that “... the decision to search for opportunities
is an enterprising decision requiring entrepreneurial intuition and imagination
and must precede the ‘economic’ decision to go ahead with the examination of
opportunities for expansion” (1959: 34).
We may now sum up this brief discussion and note that although the
literature - whether managerialist economics á la Baumol (1962) and Marris
(1964) or the recent resource-based strategy literature - may have addressed some
key themes in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, much else has been missed.
Not surprisingly, what has been addressed has been those features that lend
themselves to a treatment that is congenial to mainstream economics, and those
features that have been left out are those that clash with basic mainstream ideas.
                                               
17  Elaborating the cognitive content of the notion of the firm’s productive opportunity, Penrose
explains that there  “... is a close relation between the various kinds of resources with which the
firm works and the development of the ideas, experience and knowledge of its managers and
entrepreneurs” (Penrose 1959: 85).
18  And as Penrose further explains, the image is heavily conditioned by “... the resources with
which a firm works and on the development of the experience and knowledge of a firm’s
personnel because these are the factors that will to a large extent determine the response of the
firm to changes in the external world and also determine what it ‘sees’ in the external world”
(1959: 79-80).
19  It should be noted  that the idea of the image is not just another version of the ideas of
bounded rationality and tacit knowledge.  It explicitly recognizes that agents have to make sense
of their world, that agents' cognitive development is molded in social processes, and it implies
that tacitness is an aspect of virtually all acts of interpretation and meaning attribution.
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For example, a major focus of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm lies in the
production of services and the application of resources and services, a main
argument being that many heterogeneous services may be yielded by the same
resources, depending on the uses to which the management team decide to put
them and depending on the knowledge its has of these resources.  But this has
been almost entirely neglected by many resource-based theorists who only
consider the issues of the terms at which resources were acquired (Barney 1986)
and/or whether they are protected (Peteraf 1993), but forget that it is the actual
application in production, and not the mere possession, of resources that create
revenue (Spender 1994).   The other main literature that has addressed Penrosian
ideas, the managerialist theory of the firm, on the other hand, suppressed all
those considerations that could not be integrated with (or, of course, were
irrelevant to) simple models in which managerial capacity acts as a constraint on
growth.
Indeed, the overall impression of the theory contained The Theory of the
Growth of the Firm that emerges from the literature is one of a theory stressing
rigidity and path-dependence.  Thus, in each period of time there is a strict
managerial limit (although it  recedes in the next periods) constraining growth
and the firm’s horizontal boundaries are narrowly constrained to neighboring
product-markets.  The point of the above discussion has been to argue that it is
more sensible to think of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm as stressing
constrained flexibility.  Penrose’s basic, and too often overlooked, themes are
flexibility in an uncertain world, organizational learning as an evolutionary
discovery process, the vision of the management team, entrepreneurship, etc.,
and she applies those themes to an understanding of firm growth through
diversification, finding in the process of application that there are powerful
factors that constrain flexibility, learning, vision and discovery.
It is one thing to argue that an important work has been misread,
misinterpreted, neglected, etc.; quite another thing is to argue that those aspects
15
that were misread, etc. still matter.  The following section argues that in fact there
are still important lessons to be derived from the work of Penrose, particularly
with respect to contemporary theorizing on the firm.
III. Implications for Contemporary
 Theorizing About the Firm
In The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Penrose was both critical and constructive;
critical of the limitations of the neoclassical theory of the firm of her day, and
clearly constructive by putting forward a new theory of the firm, based on
knowledge and cognition.   In a similar vein, the purpose of this section is to
criticize contemporary neoclassical theories of the firm, namely contractual
theories, from a Penrosian point of view, and to suggest how Penrosian insights
may further the theory of the firm, considered from the point of view of
contemporary theorizing.
A. The Heuristics of the Modern Contractual Theory of the Firm20
Although there is undoubtedly some diversity in the contractual (or, Coasian)
theory of the firm associated with such names as Ronald Coase (1937), Oliver
Williamson (1985, 1996), Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992) and Oliver Hart
(1995), it is fair to say that the literature is in agreement on the fundamentals.  The
basic insight is that in addition to production costs of the usual sort, one must
also consider transaction costs in explaining institutions like the firm.  Indeed, the
Coasean literature of the last 25 years has indeed focused precisely on the
comparative transaction costs of alternative organizational structures, including,
paradigmatically, the choice between firms and markets.   Moreover, the
literature has seen “the nature of the firm” — and of other institutions — as
fundamentally contractual.  That is, firms and other institutions are alternative
                                               
20  This section borrows from Langlois and Foss (1997).
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bundles of contracts, understood as mechanisms for creating and realigning
incentives.  Finally, these bundles are seen as efficient ones, in the sense that they
efficiently handle the real resource scarcities associated with asymmetric
information and bounded rationality and maximize joint surplus.21
Whatever their differences may be, one central heuristic characterizes all the
different streams that together constitute the modern theory of the firm: an
overriding emphasis on conceptualizing virtually all problems of economic
organization as problems of aligning incentives.  A specific example of this
heuristic is a recent paper by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994).   They address what
is often seen as a Penrosian theme, namely that firms may be better off pursuing
narrow strategies.  Specifically, they use the incomplete contract framework of
Oliver Hart (e.g., 1995) to argue that a firm may choose a narrow strategy (and
thus ignore profitable opportunities) because strategic breadth leads to
implementation problems ex post that distort ex ante incentives.  They do note (p.
1131) that “increasing returns to specialization” (because of learning advantages
from concentrating on well-defined capabilities) may be an independent reason
for narrow strategies, but they do not investigate that possibility - because this
would mean breaking with the heuristic of reducing all problems of economic
organization to problems of aligning incentives.22
                                               
21  As has often been pointed out, there is a strong functionalist orientation to this literature, one
that arguably would be wholly alien to Penrose (cf. Foss 1998a).  This orientation is supported by
the suppression of knowledge in the contractual literature which again allows the suppression of
cumulative processes resulting from the growth of knowledge inside and between firms (about
which, see Loasby 1991).
22 A broader example is supplied by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts’ successful textbook,
Economics, Organization and Management (1992) in which the managerial task is essentially
reduced to the provision of the right incentives.  As Brian Loasby (1995) points out, the book
contains much interesting material about economics, less material about organization and
relatively little that a more traditional scholar in the field would call management, including
strategic management, proper.  To put it in a pointed way, the book certainly does not tell us “...
how Jones should decide what to do at nine o’clock on Monday morning” (Loasby 1995: 474).
But this is the crucial issue: how is the set of possible choices discovered? How are the
consequences known?  These are issues of discovery and imagination, and they are not easily
translated into the language of optimization and incentives.  However, they are what managers,
particular higher-ranking ones, do.
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The problem is not that reformulations of traditional management and
strategy issues in terms of the provision of incentives are internally inconsistent.
Rather, the issue is whether the mechanisms so identified are in fact plausible
explanations of the phenomena under study.  In fact, it is quite likely that the
mechanisms underneath, for example, the narrow firm strategies that Rotemberg
and Saloner (1994) talk about have little or nothing to do with the alignment of
incentives, and have everything to do with limited knowledge, learning and
vision - in short, with crucial Penrosian themes.
The point here is not that one should never model problems of organization
or management as only problems of incentive alignment.  Arguably, an important
aspect of how agents can adapt to knowledge dispersed among them has to do
with overcoming impediments in the form of incentive conflicts.   But certainly
casual empiricism confirms that issues that relate to organizational language,
shared vision and other issues that were highlighted by Penrose in her analysis of
the managerial team, are also crucial for understanding the coordination of
knowledge in most social systems, including firms.  Thus, to conceptualize
coordination, leadership and managerial activity in general as a merely a matter
of providing the right incentives closes off a range of plausible alternative
explanations of what firms are and what strategic managers do. In order to
investigate other plausible alternative explanations it may pay off as a research
strategy to suppress the heuristic of conceptualizing all coordinative and
managerial activity as a matter of providing the right incentives under conditions
of asymmetric information, and focus instead on more cognitive issues.   The
following section takes a few stabs at this.
B. Knowledge and Cognition
A pertinent place to begin is where Penrose began: with managerial cognition
and decision-making.  In the view taken by Penrose23, managers exercise
                                                                                                                                            
23  And much earlier by Frank Knight (1921).   A modern development of Penrose’s analysis of
cognition is Earl (1984).
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judgment based on their imagination (Shackle 1972).   Imagination, in turn, is
partly rooted in (imperfect) cognition and knowledge.24  Thus, arguably the
essence of strategic decision making is not choice among given alternatives,25 but
the process by which the strategizer understands his environment (including, as
Penrose stressed, “his” firm’s resources), define which variables are relevant,
attaches meaning to information and produce problem-solving heuristics.  All our
knowledge of this sort of problem-solving behavior in complex environments
indicates that it, first, is not best represented by an optimization calculus (Dosi
and Marengo 1994), and, secondly, is of considerably broader scope than finding
the transaction cost minimizing organizational form.  If (strategic) managers are
judged by their ability to make the right choices among a set which they
themselves partly generate, they are also judged by their ability to break with
existing practice, to mediate and to engage in sense-making (Weick 1995).  Thus,
leadership and the provision of cognitive frames enter the picture.
These are phenomena that are hard to accommodate in the context of
organizational economics, which - like the rest of mainstream economics -
assumes that agents come endowed with essentially the same cognitive frames.
This means that “... ignored in most economic theory is the possibility - indeed
the virtual certainty - that the way each of us frames problems will prevent us
from recognizing significant opportunities or major threats” (Foss and Loasby
1998: 11).  Thus, the manager of division A has essentially the same
understanding of what goes on “out there” as the manager of division B, and as
top-management.   Therefore, his failure to take the right action (or provide the
right level of effort) can only be ascribed to morally hazardous behavior.
                                                                                                                                            
24 Indeed, the formation of a new firm or a new venture is an instance of something imagined
deemed possible on the basis of the available evidence (Knight 1921).
25  For example, given governance structures.
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In reality, however, an important part of what managers do, and a major
organizational design problem, is to get everybody on the same wavelength, as it
were.  Now, organizational design has a long history in formal economics, for
example, in the guise of mechanism design where part of the designer’s task is to
design codes and languages that will allow agents to efficiently respond to
messages from the center.   But in the context of real-world firms, this portrayal of
the designer’s task may be grossly misleading: in order to design optimal codes,
the designer must the know the entire range of possible realizations of each
agent’s (employee’s) private information, which is not only highly unlikely given
the dispersed nature of knowledge in large firms but also neglects that the whole
premise of the analysis is limited communication and knowledge (Wernerfelt
1997).   Furthermore, information is not just private, but also empirical26 and tacit
in the sense of Polanyi (1958) of not being given to verbal expression.   Finally,
Shacklian surprises may be involved, which means that map from states of the
world to actions is incompletely specified.
All this implies that concepts such as adaptation, coordination,
management, etc. become intimately associated with learning, rather than with
picking alternatives out of an already known set.27  Moreover, because of the
surprise element, learning must involve more than Bayesian revision of priors
into posteriors (which arguably is more in the nature of information processing
than in the nature of true learning); it must also involve setting up new
interpretive frameworks - new “images”, in Penrose’s (1959) terms - for handling
new types of problems.   Indeed, in this perspective, the essence of economic
behavior would seem to lie in understanding the environment, defining what are
the relevant variables in that environment, making sense of incoming
                                               
26  In the Hayekian sense that agents primarily seek “knowledge of the particular circumstances
of time and place” (Hayek 1945: 52). Closely related to this, knowledge is problemistic in the
sense that it arises in the context of a problem situation.
27  This will certainly not come as a surprise to modern organization theorists; see, for example,
March (1988).
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information, generating procedures which can help solving problems, and,
finally, actually taking action  (ibid.; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Marengo 1995).
In terms of the economics of information, one implication is that the
“information partition postulate” (Marengo 1995) should be discarded. This
postulate holds that there 1) is an isomorphism between the real world and an
agent’s image of it, 2) that agents only differ with respect to decision-making
capabilities in terms of how fine or coarse their information partitions are, 3) that
information partitions are given, and 4) that genuine knowledge gaps, such as
mistakes and surprises, can be ruled out (ibid.).   If these assumptions
hold, it is hard to argue that rational, interacting agents should persistently hold
different images of the world.  In such a setting, coordination problems are if not
entirely eliminated then certainly much reduced in importance.  The economic
problem essentially reduces to giving people who already are on “the same
wavelength”, as it were, the right incentives - that is, the problem studied in
virtually all of the modern economics of organization.
However, if it cannot be presumed that division X understands the same by the
message “the state of the world is Z” as division Y does, or if the divisions do not
understand the message at all, then the overriding organizational design objective is
creating a shared knowledge-base and getting everybody on the same wave-length.
In firms that primarily grow through mergers and acquisitions this may be an
extremely time-consuming and costly process, and this has often been singled out as
one of the important reasons why mergers may break up again. Agents that are
engaged in productive activities often spontaneously develop shared mental
construct, or, if you like, “corporate cultures”, that help coordinating distributed
knowledge by infusing employees with firm-specific shared knowledge; that is, they
are Schelling points that resolve basic coordination problems.28
                                               
28  The significance of these shared mental constructs lies not only in helping the coordination of
existing distributed knowledge; they also help coordinate intra-firm learning processes. In short, they
help the firm organize a localized discovery procedure (as distinct from the global discovery
procedure of the market).  However, shared mental constructs also change over time - along with the
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C. Penrosian Insights and the Theory of the Firm
In this section, I present in telegraphic form some consequences for the theory of the
firm of adopting the Penrosian perspective on cognition and knowledge described in
the previous section.
As a starting point, we can imagine many ways in which knowledge may be
present in a social system; for example, knowledge - whether it is explicit or tacit,
subjective or objective, etc. - may be
1. Private: Private is here used in the standard sense of the term.  Agents know
different things and this knowledge is not brought into contact.
2. Distributed: This means is that a group of cooperating agents “know”
something that no individual agent knows.  For example, literally speaking, no
individual agent knows how General Motors makes cars; it is the whole team
of GM employees that possesses this knowledge.  Of course, there can be a sort
of transcendental knowledge of distributed knowledge, for example, when a
Penrosian management team knows that the firm’s distributed knowledge can
be mobilized in certain productive tasks.
3. Shared: Agents share some knowledge about the world.  For example, the
management team in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm share an image of the
environment and is agreed on the character of the firm’s productive
opportunity.
4. Common:  This is the game-theoretic notion that “I know that you know that I
know...etc.”.
Of course, this taxonomy29 in itself says little or nothing about the organization of
the relevant knowledge, in terms of  markets, hierarchies and other types of
                                                                                                                                            
learning processes they help organize. We are talking, in effect, about “co-evolutionary” processes
(Marengo 1995).
29   Which I owe to Luigi Marengo.
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governance.  For example, knowledge can be shared (category 3) inside firms,
across firms, in industries, in whole societies, etc.; in principle, irrespective of
whether it is explicit or tacit.  For example, moral codes are very broadly
disseminated knowledge, containing much tacit knowledge.  However, one may
conjecture that the “thickness” of tacit knowledge is a negative function of the
size of the relevant social group.  Thus, firms and families may, because of the
continuity of association, cultivate much more shared tacit knowledge (whatever
that precisely means) than broader social entities.  To the extent that this tacit
knowledge is valuable, there may be a link to the existence of such smaller social
entities.30
More generally, it may be suggested that interesting problems of economic
organization are primarily related to categories 2 and 3, although it is categories 1
and 4 that have typically been the dominant ones in economics.  For example,
with common knowledge assumptions all problems relating to economic
organization - both coordination and incentive-related problems - are trivialized.
On the other hand, the notions of distributed and shared knowledge, both of
which are strongly emphasized in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, raise
important but ill-understood problems for the theory of economic organization,
some of which will briefly be mentioned in the rest of this section.
First, distributed knowledge must somehow be coordinated if it is to be
useful in productive tasks.  In principle, any social organization faces this
coordination problem (Hayek 1945).  For some productive tasks, distributed
knowledge may be coordinated by means of the price mechanism, while other
productive tasks require a shared knowledge base.   As Marengo (1995) argues, if
agents entering the firm held the completely same habits of thought/models of
the world, the only obstacle to efficient coordination of their actions would be
                                                                                                                                            
30 For example, in terms of the standard contractual story, knowledge-based rents need a
governance structure that can safeguard them against opportunistic attempts at appropriation.
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precisely the sort of incentive problems that preoccupy modern organizational
economists.  However, in a world in which agents do not share exactly the same
models and do not know each others’ models, a collective knowledge base is
required for coordination.  As simulation work, built on the theory of classifier
systems, demonstrate, such a knowledge base - a Penrosian image - may develop as
a result of organizational learning under rather general assumptions (ibid.).
Moreover, because of the role of chance and lock-in, firms will develop different
knowledge bases for coordinating their stocks of distributed knowledge.   This helps
accounting for firm heterogeneity - or, if you like, differential capabilities -, and, to
the extent that collective knowledge bases influence productive and transactional
efficiency (which is more than likely), also helps accounting for differences in
revealed competitive advantages.
However, while this puts some more conceptual meat on the skeleton of
“knowledge-based assets” often encountered in the resource-based literature on
the firm, it does not say anything directly about the firm-market boundary.  In
other words, why is it that sometimes markets can coordinate distributed
knowledge and sometimes firm organization is necessary?   The answer may turn
on differences in the histories of emergence of collective knowledge bases, which,
I have suggested help us understand the phenomenon of differential capabilities.
Thus, if capabilities are “dis-similar”, in the Penrose-inspired terminology of
George Richardson (1972), it is because they are supported by different
underlying collective knowledge bases, including managerial images.
In Richardson’s terminology, production can be broken down into various
stages or activities.  Some activities are similar, in that they draw on the same
general capabilities.  Activities can also be complementary in that they are
connected in the chain of production and therefore need to be coordinated with
one another.   Juxtaposing different degrees of similarity against different degrees
of complementarity produces a matrix that maps different types of economic
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organization.  For example, closely complementary and similar activities may be
best undertaken under unified governance.
Richardson’s insight is a simple but extremely profound one.   For it
suggests that - as a quite general matter - capabilities are determinants of the
boundaries of the firm.   Problems of economic organization may crucially reflect
the possibility that a firm may control production knowledge that is, in important
dimensions, strongly different from what others control.  Thus, the management
team of one firm may quite literally not understand what the management team of
another firm wants from them (for example, in supplier contracts) or is offering them
(for example, in license contracts).  Their respective Penrosian images are not
overlapping, as it were.   In this setting, the costs of making contacts with potential
partners, of educating potential licensees and franchisees, of teaching suppliers what
it is one needs from them, etc., become very real factors determining where the
boundaries of firms will be placed.31
Note that these dynamic transaction costs, as they have been called by Richard
Langlois (1992), are in a different category from the transaction costs usually
considered in the post-Coase literature.  They have a cognitive dimension that is not
encountered in that literature.  Langlois and Robertson (1995) build a broad theory
of industrial dynamics around the idea of dynamic transaction costs.  The
organizational question is whether new capabilities are best acquired through the
market, through internal learning, or through some hybrid organizational form.
Langlois and Robertson argue that the answer will depend on (A) the already-
existing structure of capabilities (does a reconfiguration of capabilities require
vertical integration or rather the supersession of existing vertically integrated
firms by more market-like forms?) and (B) the nature of the economic change
involved (is the relevant innovations autonomous or systemic?).
                                               
31  One is reminded of the, possibly apochryphical, story about the Japanese supplier firm,
committed to total quality, zero defects managements, that unable to make sense of a
requirement from its American buyer of 95 % defect free deliveries sent a separately boxed batch
of 5 % deliberately broken parts and a note saying “We don’t know why you want these”.
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The upshot of all this is that an analysis of organizational cognition, for
example, along the lines pioneered by Edith Penrose and founded on the idea of
the image, may provide an alternative to existing contractual theories of the
boundaries of the firm.  Moreover, it may strengthen the capabilities theory on
this subject (Foss 1993; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Hodgson 1996; Langlois and
Foss 1997), which has merely started from the empirical generalization that firms
control different production and organization knowledge, without fundamentally
inquiring into the reasons for such differences.   It is noteworthy in this
connection that Penrose herself explained that many of her ideas about
diversification  were “equally applicable to vertical diversification” (1959: 145).
As she pointed out,
... backward integration may appear profitable because the firm
believes it can produce some of its requirements so much more
cheaply than it can obtain them in the market that the reduction in
costs adds more to total profits than any alternative use of resources
... Or a firm may have special productive advantages which enable it
to produce at exceptionably low cost (1959: 148).
The import of such comments is, of course, that the make-or-buy decision may
turn on considerations of production costs (rather than transaction costs), or, what
comes to the same thing, on differential capabilities.   Thus, among Penrose’s
many achievements is also that of anticipating the capabilities theory of the
boundaries of the firm.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has had a related twin theme: First, to argue that the literature has not
done justice to Edith Penrose’s 1959 classic The Theory of the Growth of the Firm
and, second, to argue that there still much to learn from this contribution.    Of
course, the two themes are closely related, since purportedly Penrosian
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contributions have mostly neglected Penrose’s emphasis on endogenous resource
creation, on shared, firm-specific knowledge and on the firm as an
entrepreneurial entity in an uncertain world that organizes a process of creating
real options, and these are still themes where very little progress has been done in
the context of the theory of the firm.   Thus, this paper should be read as a case
for re-opening the research program that Edith Penrose suggested in The Theory of
the Growth of the Firm.
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